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COMMENTS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL CONTROL-APPELLATE REVIEW 
OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS-During its forty-
five year life the Federal Trade Commission has gone through 
some difficult periods to emerge today as one of the fundamental 
instrumentalities of government in the regulation of business. 
Its vast powers and influence, well known to lawyers, will not 
be explored here. Rather, the purpose of this comment is to 
appraise the extent of control which the judiciary now exercises 
over the commission in its adjudicative functions, so as to offer 
some indication to the practitioner of the probabilities regard-
ing the outcome of judicial review on an appeal beyond the full 
commission. The approach to be used will be a study of Supreme 
Court cases involving the commission since 1914 along with a 
review of Federal Trade Commission cases that have been before 
the courts of appeals since 194 7. 
While the use of statistics is subject to at least some skepticism 
when the improbabilities of judicial review are involved, statistics 
here provide a helpful introduction and point of departure. The 
table presented below is based on a review of 106 cases cited in 
the 99 recent volumes of the Federal Reporter, Second Series.1 
The study covers only cases in which the courts were reviewing 
substantive decisions of the commission acting in an adjudicative 
capacity. Thus, all cases involving subpoenas or the enjoining 
of trade practice rules are omitted. In addition, those cases which 
were affirmed per curiam and without comment and those rais-
ing other problems not here relevant are not included. 
The number of cases reviewed by the courts of appeals has 
increased over the past decade. There were four in 1948, sixteen 
in 1957 and eleven in 1958. It may be of particular interest to 
note that thirty-four of the cases appealed were taken to the 
Seventh Circuit, twenty to the Second Circuit, twelve to the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and fewer than 
ten to each of the others. 
The results on appeal are presented in the following table: 
1 The study ranges from 163 F. (2d) 1 (1947) to 261 F. (2d) 440 (1959). 
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RESULTS ON REVIEW BY COURTS OF APPEALS 
. ,, 
Allirmcd Fact Fact 
Circuit Total with Question Question Law 
Coun Appeals Allirmcd2 Modifi- Total Partial Question 
cations3 Reverse' Reverse" Revcr,cS 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2 20 13 2 0 3 2 
3. 8 7 1 0 0 0 
4 .. 7 3 3 1 0 0 
5_, .. 3 1 0 0 0 2 
6 5 3 0 0 1 I 
7 34 17 7 4 4 2 
8 6 5 0 0 0 1 
9. 9 5 1 0 1 2 
10 . : 1 1 0 0 0 0 
DC 13 7 4 0 0 2 
Totals 107 62 18 5 9 13 
Tliis statistical analysis would be incomplete without a review 
of the same cases before the United States Supreme Court. At 
the time of this ·writing eighteen of the cases had been before 
the Supreme Court on the merits. In fourteen of them the result 
in the court of appeals had been to cut down the breadth of the 
commission's order in some way. Of the four court of appeals 
decisiops which affirmed commission orders, the Supreme Court 
sustained three. Of the other fourteen, the Court agreed with 
the appellate court on six, but on eight entered an order more 
favorable to the commission. 
A final figure: at the conclusion of all appellate litigation, 
2 The cases included here are ones in which the order of the FTC was wholly 
affirmed. 
8 This includes cases in which the findings of the FTC were sustained, but the scope 
of the order was modified in some way. This classification includes those cases in which 
there was any modification of the order. 
4 This classification includes those cases in which the petition to review was com-
pletely sustained, thus amounting to a dismissal of the FTC's complaint for failure to 
find substantial evidence to support any of the findings of the commission. 
5 The cases grouped here include those in which the court failed to find substantial 
evidence to support some part of the findings of the FTC. This may relate to a single 
respondent or to a part of the findings against a single respondent, Thus, this category 
includes those cases in which there has been affirmation of a part of the commission's 
order. 
6 This includes those cases which the court reviewed as an issue of law, found the 
FTC to be in error, and reversed. 
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respondent7 was required to cease and desist from some practice, 
or the case was remanded to the commission for further proceed-
mgs, in 92 of the 107 cases. 
I. Issues Available for Review on Appeal 
Whether a reviewing court will even consider an issue raised 
on appeal is preliminary to the type of review that will be afforded. 
As recently as 1958 the Supreme Court indicated that a reviewing 
court should not entertain a question not raised before the 
commission. 8 This policy has been adhered to in the courts 
below.9 
One circumstance in which this problem could arise, which 
is deserving of special attention, is where the hearing examiner 
is reversed by the full commission and an appeal is subsequently 
taken by respondent. In a recent case the hearing examiner 
found that respondent's advertising was false and misleading, 
but dismissed the complaint because in his view the practice 
had been discontinued. In that posture of the case, only counsel 
supporting the complaint appealed to the full commission. After 
determining that the practices had not been discontinued, the 
commission ordered respondent to cease and desist. Then re-
spondent brought the action to the court of appeals. That court 
refused to consider respondent's claim that the findings of the 
examiner were unsupported by substantial evidence, saying that 
the failure to file a cross-appeal to the commission prevented 
respondent from raising this objection on appeal.1° 
II. Distinguishing Questions of Law and Fact 
In analyzing the type of judicial review afforded in Federal 
Trade Commission proceedings, it may be helpful to charac-
terize the reviewing court's activity. Concern here is with deter-
mining what are questions of "fact," where judicial review is 
limited, and what are questions of "law," where the scope of re-
7 "Respondent" is used throughout this paper to refer to the party opposing the 
FTC without regard ,to the court involved or the party actually seeking review. 
8 Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 at 414 (1958). See also United States v. 
Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33 at 37 (1952). 
9 See, e.g., 'Marlene's, Inc. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 556 at 558, and Barclay 
Home Products, Inc. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d) 451, cert. den. 354 U.S. 942 (1957). 
10 American Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 289, cert. 
den. 358 U.S. 875 (1958). 
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view is much broader. It will be seen that calling an issue one 
of "fact" or "law" is only the characterization of a result rather 
than a tool used in determining the proper scope of review. 
Turning first to the problem of determining what constitutes 
an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or 
practice, the Supreme Court stated in the early case of Federal 
Trade Commission v. Gratz: "The words 'unfair method of 
competition' are not defined by the statute and their meaning is 
in dispute. It is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately 
to determine as a matter of law what they include .... "11 
The same problem was before the Court in 1953 in Motion 
Picture Advertising Service Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.12 
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, 13 reaffirmed the doctrine of the 
Gratz case. Justice Douglas' majority opinion, however, can easily 
be given a contrary meaning.14 That opinion can be reconciled 
with Gratz, 15 but only if it can be said that the conflicting remarks 
were addressed solely to the question of the remedy. This latter 
interpretation is plausible, though unlikely, because the cases 
he referred to dealt only with that point.16 If what seem to be 
Justice Douglas' views are accepted, however, it now appears 
that whenever a "technical"17 unfair method of competition is 
involved the courts will abdicate their function as expounded 
in the Gratz case and simply rubber-stamp the commission. 
11 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 at 427 (1920). 
12 344 U.S. 392 (1953). 
13 Id. at 404. 
14 "The precise impact of a particular practice on -the trade is for the Commission, 
not the courts, to determine. The point where a method of competition becomes 'unfair' 
within the meaning of the Act will often tum on the exigencies of a particular situation, 
trade practices, or the practical requirements of the business in question." Majority 
opinion of Justice Douglas, id. at 396. 
15 Justice Douglas also said: "It is, we •think, plain from the Commission's findings 
that a device which has sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within 
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and is therefore an 'unfair method of competition' 
within the meaning of Section 5(a) of ·the Federal Trade Commission Act." Id. at 395. 
16 Jacob Siegel v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 at 612 (1946), and FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 
U.S. 683 at 726·727 (1948). 
17 To distinguish a technical from a non-technical unfair method of competition it 
is necessary only to compare the facts of the 'Motion Picture Advertising case with those 
in Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), mod. 312 U.S. 668 
(1941). In the former the issue was the impact of leases of advertising "trailers" to movie 
houses for varying lengths of time. Knowledge of theater practices, costs and profits of 
movie makers, and the total available market for advertising shorts were significant, 
and an expert body might be better equipped to analyze such facts. In the latter case 
one of the questions was more general, i.e., whether an incipient Sherman Act violation 
could be an unfair method of competition. 
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It may be that the opinion of Justice Stone in the 1934 case 
of Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bro.18 can be used 
to explain these two conflicting opinions. Justice Stone approved 
the Gratz doctrine, then noted that when the court is deciding 
what is an unfair method of competition . "the determination 
of the Commission is of weight."19 The remainder of the opinion 
is directed to the special competence of the commission to deal 
with such matters and the expansibility of the phrase to include 
novel methods not previously deemed illegal. The decision of 
the Court was a reinstatement of the commission's order after 
a reversal by the court of appeals. The practical answer ·may well 
be that the commission's decision will usually be final. More 
narrowly, it may be said that the courts of appeals generally 
adhere to the commission's conclusion that a particular. practice 
is an unfair method of competition, though in most of these cases 
their decisions are arrived at through independent examination.20 
In cases involving misrepresentations the courts ·are. more 
willing to accept the conclusions of the commission,. but this 
is apparently on the premise that it is clear that misrepresenta-
tions are unfair or deceptive acts or practices.21 Confirmation 
that courts are arriving at independent conclusions as, to what 
is an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive 
act or practice occurs where the commission is reversed. This 
has occurred, for example, when the question raised was whether 
a particular scheme was a lottery22 and when the case involved 
whether certain trade association activity was an unfair method 
of competition.23 
Since the statute defines the term "false advertisement,"24 and 
provides that the dissemination of a "false advertisement'' by 
certain means shall be an unfair or deceptive act or. practice,25 
the broad policy question of what is within the phrase "unfair or 
deceptive act or practice" is determined by Congress. Because of 
this, judicial review in this area is ordinarily limited to. a review 
18 291 U.S. 304 (1934). 
19 Id. at 314. 
20 See, e.g., Bennett v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 362 and Gay Games, Inc. v. 
FTC, (10th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 197. 
21See, e.g., Independent Directory Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 468, and 
Kalwajtys v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 654, cert. den. 352 U.S. 1025 (1957). 
22 J. C. Martin Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 530. 
23 Tag Mfgrs. Institute v. FTC, (1st Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 452. 
24 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §55a. 
25 52 Stat. 115 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §52b. 
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of the findings of fact, the principal findings being that the ad-
vertisement involved is in fact false, that it was disseminated as 
prescribed by the statute, and that the order is proper.26 On 
occasion, however, the courts have treated as questions of law the 
issue whether an advertisement is false simply because it does 
not point out the product's shortcomings27 and the effect of the 
word "free" in an advertisement.28 On the other hand the Fourth 
Circuit felt it was a question of fact whether an advertisement 
that was technically true could be false.29 No positive formula is 
seen regarding when the courts will conclude one way or the other 
in this particular area. 
Another significant issue involves price discrimination under 
the Robinson-Patman Act. A number of questions which have 
arisen recently concern statutory interpretation, such as where 
the burden of proof lies, and are clearly questions of which 
the courts will make an independent determination. The estab-
lishment of a good faith defense was the subject of protracted 
litigation recently involving the Standard Oil Company. The 
Seventh Circuit on remand decided that whether respondent 
had established a good faith defense was a matter of law, and it 
then reversed the commission.30 On certiorari, the Supreme Court 
concluded this was a factual issue and accordingly limited its 
review to a consideration of whether the court of appeals had 
given the record a "fair assessment." This, it decided, had been 
given.31 
The Supreme Court's action in this case can be explained 
by its statement in 1945 that "Congress has left to the Com-
mission the determination of fact in each case whether the per-
son, charged with making discriminatory prices, acted in good 
faith to meet a competitor's equally low prices. The determina-
tion of this fact from the evidence is for the Commission. . . . "32 
The status of this point today, as far as the Supreme Court is 
concerned, is apparently clear, although there are still other 
unresolved fact questions concerning the scope of the defense. 
26 See, e.g., Arrow Metal Products Corp. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1957) 249 F. (2d) 88, and 
Trade Union Courier Publishing Corp. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1956) 232 F. (2d) 636. 
21 Alberty v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 36, cert. den. 340 U.S. 818 (1950). 
28 Book of the Month Club, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 486. 
29 P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 52. 
so Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 649, affd. 355 U.S. 396 (1958). 
31 FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958). 
32 FTC v. Staley Co., 324 U.S. 746 at 758 (1945). 
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On the issue whether respondent's prices were actually dis-
criminatory, the Second Circuit, in concluding that the practices 
were lawful, stated: "The argument is also made that because 
the Commission has _a special competence in the field of grocery 
chain stores, its determination as to whether a given practice 
violates the Robinson-Patman Act cannot be disturbed. The 
expertise possessed by an administrative agency, however, does 
not empower it to rewrite the laws which it has been charged 
with enforcing. This is the function of Congress."33 
In trying to ascertain an overall pattern in these cases it 
might be well to distinguish between two types of statutory 
language: that of a general nature, as "unfair methods of com-
petition," and that which connotes a historic jural meaning, 
as "good faith." In the former the language means little in the 
skeleton form in which it comes from the legislature. It seems 
proper for the courts to have the final say, as a matter of law, 
on the substantial contents of the statute. This certainly must 
have been the intention of Congress when it passed such a general 
statute, for it has been accepted practice with regard to other 
statutes as, for example, the Sherman Act. Additionally, it is 
questionable if Congress would want to vest authority for such 
interpretation of a statute in the agency that also acts as prosecu-
tor under the statute. Moreover, the degree of expertise helpful 
in arriving at a decision would not seem to be relevant. Thus, 
it seems, the thirty-nine year old Gratz doctrine should still be 
good law. On the other hand, when the statutory language it-
self has substantive meaning, such as "good faith," it seems 
proper to relegate to the commission the question whether re-
spondent's conduct fits into the required pattern. This might 
explain why establishment of a good faith defense is considered 
a fact question. 
III. Judicial Review on the "Public Interest" Requirement 
When acting pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, the commission is authorized to act only "if it shall appear 
to the commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof 
would be to the interest of the public."34 The provision was first 
33 Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 365 at 374. 
84 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45b. No such requirement is specified when 
the commission acts pursuant to the Clayton Act. 
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before the Supreme Court in 1929 in Federal Trade Commission 
v. Klesrter,35 when the Court affirmed a dismissal of the commis-
sion's complaint by the court of appeals. The Court said by way of 
illustration, not as an exclusive enumeration, that the public 
interest was involved when the unfair method threatened the 
existence of present or potential competition, when the strong 
were attempting flagrantly to oppress the weak, or when the 
loss to a particular person was so small that no one individual 
would bring an action to halt a practice that affected an entire 
group.86 It noted that the commission exercised "a broad dis-
cretion" in its determination but that the public interest must 
be "specific and substantial."87 After reviewing the facts, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the requi-
site public interest was lacking, viewing the case as a private dis-
pute between competing firms.88 Four years later the Court made a 
similar review on the public interest question, saying, "We also 
are of the opinion that it sufficiently appears that the proceeding 
was in the interest of the public."89 More recently the issue has 
not been raised before the Supreme Court. 
Decisions in the courts of appeals indicate that those courts 
will sustain the decision of the commission regarding public 
interest unless there has been an "abuse of discretion," this 
phrase being employed to describe the Klesner doctrine. It 
means, apparently, an inquiry into whether the commission 
properly appraised the relevant factors. All four recent cases 
that specifically raised the question sustained the conclusion of 
the commission.40 
While the Klesner approach has been used consistently by the 
courts of appeals, it is at least arguable that their power to 
review is not so broad. The statute puts the decision squarely 
85 280 U.S. 19 (1929). 
36Id. at 28. 
37Ibid. 
38 Compare American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79 
(1956), where the Supreme Court limited its review under a similar statute to a considera• 
tion of whether the Civil Aeronautics Board used appropriate criteria to determine 
whether the proceeding was in the public interest. 
39 FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 at 216 (1933). And see also FTC v. Algoma 
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 at 81 (1934). 
40 ,Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. v. FTC, (5th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 633, 
revd. on other grounds 344 U.S. 392 (1953); Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1952) 
198 F. (2d) 404, cert. den. 344 U.S. 912 (1953); Dejay Stores, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1952) 
200 F. (2d) 865; Standard Distributors v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 7. 
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up to the commission, and it would seem that the reviewing 
courts have exceeded their powers when they look to see if the 
commission's discretion has been abused. Rather, it seems, judi-
cial review should be limited to an inquiry into whether the 
"appropriate criteria" have been considered by the commission, 
especially in view of the Supreme Court's recent expounding of 
this test under an analogous statute.41 
IV. Judicial Review on Questions of Fact 
A. Background. The extent of judicial review on questions 
of fact has undergone a significant change within the past decade. 
The original practice under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act was that commission findings were conclusive "if supported 
by evidence."42 The procedure of the reviewing court was to look 
only at one side of the record to see if it could ferret out sufficient 
evidence to support the findings, paying no heed to what counter-
balanced that evidence on the other side. This prompted Justice 
Black to note in a 1937 decision that "the courts cannot pick 
and choose bits of evidence to make findings of fact contrary 
to the findings of the commission. The record in this case is 
filled with evidence of witnesses under oath which supports the 
commission's findings."43 He reversed the court of appeals after 
that court had upset the commission's findings.44 
The Administrative Procedure Act45 and its subsequent in-
terpretation by the courts has brought about a change in the 
extent of judicial review. Justice Frankfurter stated in Universal 
Camera Corp. v. Labor Board46 that the "courts must now assume 
more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of [agency] 
decisions than some courts have shown in the past."47 He went 
on to state that the reviewing court is charged with finding that 
41 American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956). See 
note 39 supra. 
42 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45c. There is a similar provision in the 
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21. 
43 FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 at 117 (1937), motion to amend 
opinion denied 302 U.S. 661 (1938). 
44 For other cases that apply the same test, see, e.g., Consumers Home Equipment 
Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 972, and Excelsior Laboratory v. FTC, (2d Cir. 
1948) 171 F. (2d) 484. 
45 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1009e. 
46 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
47 Id. at 490. 
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the evidence as a whole supports the findings of the agency, 
noting what detracts from the findings as well as what contrib-
utes to them. This analysis does not mean that the court may 
run roughshod over the findings of the agency, for they "are 
entitled to respect,"48 but it does mean that these findings must 
be set aside when "the record before a Court of Appeals clearly 
precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair 
estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed 
judgment on matters within its special competence or both."49 
B. A Review of Recent Courts of Appeals Affirmations. When 
the reviewing court affirms the findings of fact made by the 
commission, its emphasis is likely to be on the powers of the 
commission. When the court overrules the commission, it is 
more likely to note its own prerogatives. The cases cited in this 
section are ones in which the reviewing court of appeals affirmed 
the commission. They seem representative of the attitude of the 
courts today. 
Regarding admissibility of evidence, the rules used in the 
federal courts are not rigidly adhered to in agency proceed-
ings.50 Where the charge is made that evidence is incompetent, 
the courts usually indicate that evidence is admissible though in-
competent, but quickly point out that the evidence before them is 
probably legally competent.51 This leaves some doubt as to how far 
the courts will go in giving effect to clearly incompetent evidence. 
The Administrative Procedure Act standard of "reliable, proba-
tive, and substantial"52 evidence will be of little help in partic-
ular situations until a body of case law is developed. U nfor-
tunately, this may not occur too rapidly, for the courts have 
taken the position that it is not reversible error to exclude 
legally incompetent evidence which meets the new statutory 
standard, 53 thus discouraging the raising of this question on 
appeal. And on the other side of the coin, if the courts adhere 
to the rule used in the district courts in non-jury cases that 
48Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941), mod. on other grounds 
312 U.S. 657 (1941). 
61 See, e.g., Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 382, mod. 348 
U.S. 940 (1955), and Buchwalter v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 344. 
52 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1006c. 
53 Doldn Corp. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 742, cert. den. 348 U.S. 981 (1955), 
found in contempt for violation of order 247 F. (2d) 524 (1956). 
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it is not reversible error to admit most evidence presented,54 
the questionable evidence will be appraised only in cases where 
that evidence tips the scales either way in the application of 
the substantial evidence test. 
Once it is determined that the evidence is properly before 
the commission, "the weight to be given to the facts and cir-
cumstances admitted, as well as the inferences reasonably to 
be drawn from them, is for the commission.''55 This rule prevents 
a respondent who has lost before the commission from dragging 
conflicting testimony into the courts to be reweighed, even 
though the commission has completely disregarded certain tes-
timony.56 The problem is usually presented when there is a 
"battle of experts" over the ultimate fact in issue, and the 
courts with unanimity adhere to the above cited rule.57 Thus 
it appears that the substantial evidence test of Universal Camera 
is met if the reviewing court is able to find that the conflicting 
testimony accepted by the commission (plus other evidence sup-
porting the same result) outweighs the evidence supporting 
the opposite result, but without considering the conflicting tes-
timony which the commission refused to adopt. 
A similar problem arises in connection with the credibility 
of witnesses, and the Second Circuit has indicated that this, 
too, is a question for the commission and not the courts.58 
The problem of the weight to be given expert testimony was 
recently raised in several cases involving the down pillow industry. 
Ten separate complaints on a false labeling charge were heard 
simultaneously by an examiner. Each side presented an expert 
witness to sustain its position, and each expert reported percentage 
figures to support his testimony. The hearing examiner averaged 
the figures of the two experts and concluded his hearing by dis-
missing three complaints. The commission determined that the 
expert supporting its position should be ·sustained, so it gave no 
54 See in this connection Judge Wyzanski's remarks in United States v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 349 at 356. 
55 This oft-cited statement appeared originally in FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade 
Assn., 273 U.S. 52 at 63 (1927). For more recent repetitions, see, e.g., Steelco Stainless Steel 
Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 693 at 697, and Standard Distributors v. FTC, 
(2d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 7 at 12. 
56 E. Edelmann &: Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 152 at 155, cert. den. 355 
U.S. 941 (1958). 
57 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 58, and Koch v. FTC, 
(6th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 311. 
58Standard Distributors v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 7. 
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weight to the testimony of the expert opposing the complaint. 
It issued an order against all ten respondents. The Second59 and 
Third6° Circuits affirmed the commission. Judge Goodrich noted 
that "we should not have done so had we been the Commission 
but the responsibility for accepting the testimony of one qualified 
expert and rejecting that of another is emphatically not a problem 
for a Court of Appeals."61 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit set 
aside the cease and desist order in one case saying that the ex• 
aminer properly averaged the conflicting figures.62 The court's 
analysis indicated that there was no basis for not giving effect 
to the testimony of both experts, and it felt bound to do so. This 
judicial intervention goes much farther than the mandates of the 
Supreme Court indicate is proper, and would probably not be 
followed in other circuits. 
A related problem involves the effect of the immunity clause 
in the Federal Trade Commission Act63 on testimony in agency 
proceedings. In a 1956 case before the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia64 respondent agreed that it was proper for 
him to testify, but argued that because of this testimony the 
commission was precluded from issuing an order against him. 
The court said that the statute did not immunize respondent from 
a cease and desist order, for it was remedial, not punitive. It 
would, however, be the basis for objecting to later criminal 
prosecution. 
Many cases can be cited where the commission acted by giving 
effect to the hearing examiner's decision. In the case where 
the hearing examiner's dismissal is reversed by the full commission 
and the court of appeals affirms, its attitude is to minimize the 
examiner's contrary result. The Fourth Circuit put it this way: 
"It is the commission, not the trial examiner, that is charged 
1vith ultimate responsibility for finding the facts; and it is the 
59 Buchwalter v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 344. 
60 Northern Feather Works v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 335. 
61 Id. at 336. 
62 Burton-Dixie Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 166. In a companion case, 
Lazar v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 176, it approved the averaging method but still 
failed to find a basis for reversal. 
63 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §49 provides ,that no person shall be excused 
from testifying because his evidence "may tend to criminate ·him or subject him to a 
penalty or forfeiture" but that he shall not be subjected to "any penalty or forfeiture" 
for such testimony. 
64 Drath v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 452, cert. den. 353 U.S. 917 (1957). 
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commission's findings and order that we are authorized to re-
view .... "65 As will be noted shortly the examiner gains greater 
stature when the court reverses the commission in this situation. 
Several cases made reference to the special competence of 
the commission in upholding its decisions. In a false advertising 
case before the Second Circuit that court upheld the finding of 
the commission in the light of its "special expertise and respon-
sibility."66 This expertise was again recognized a year later by 
the same court when it said, "the Commission is not required 
to sample public opinion to determine what meaning is conveyed 
to the public by particular advertisements." Rather it could rely on 
its own "expert experience in dealing with these matters."67 And 
in a case involving the Federal Communications Commission, Jus-
tice Reed was referring to all federal agencies when he said, 
"Courts are slow to interfere with their conclusions when re-
concilable with statutory directions."68 The Ninth Circuit took 
that to be an inhibition on the extent of its review.69 
Finally, it should be noted that the reviewing court starts 
from the premise that the findings are properly supported. Thus 
it is necessary for the appellant to call the attention of the court 
to alleged errors, for the court will not search out undesignated 
errors when a shotgun attack is made on the record below.70 
C. A Look at the Reversals. The situation in which the court 
of appeals is most likely to reverse the commission on questions 
of fact appears to be when the commission has overridden a 
dismissal by the hearing examiner. The Seventh Circuit scolded 
the commission in the following manner when it reversed a dis-
missal by the examiner of part of a complaint: "The trial ex-
aminer made a very sensible and sound recommendation based 
upon the entire record. It is difficult to understand why the 
Commission did not follow his recommendation, instead of making 
a mountain out of a pimple as they attempted to do in this 
65 Bond Crown and Cork Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 974 at 979. And see 
Goodman v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 584 at 601, where the court indicated that 
the hearing examiner's findings were entitled to weight but that ,there was no mandate 
for the commission to accept them. 
66 Savitch v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 817 at 818. 
67 E. F. Drew &: Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 735 at 741, cert. den. !152 U.S. 
969 (1957). 
68 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 at 203 (1956). 
69 Goodman v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 584 at 590. 
70 Steelco Stainless Steel Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 693. 
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case."71 The commission argued on appeal that the hearing ex-
aminer's decision was not of interest to the court. This was 
rejected, the court stating that it was as much a part of the record 
as the complaint or the testimony. It is important to note that 
the evidence on which the commission reversed the hearing ex-
aminer was in the record at the time that he made his decision. 
The commission had simply given a different interpretation to 
that testimony. · 
Another Seventh Circuit case involved an examiner's decision 
that it would not be in the public interest to issue an order at 
that time. The commission reversed in a single paragraph, after 
adopting in toto the findings of the examiner. The court reviewed 
the four facts recited in this paragraph, decided they were of 
no help in altering the examiner's conclusion, and reinstated 
his dismissal. 72 
Another type of situation in which the courts have reversed 
commission orders in several instances involves a trade associa-
tion or conspiracy case where a complaint was served on a num-
ber of different respondents. In both the Seventh 73 and the 
Second74 Circuits the appellate court showed a willingness to 
review the evidence as to each particular respondent, and it 
failed to find facts from which it could be inferred that certain 
respondents were sufficiently aligned with the conspiracy charged. 
The courts of appeals have reversed on several occasions after 
carefully scrutinizing the record and failing to find any evidence 
to support the findings or from which the commission could 
draw the inferences that it did.75 The more unusual situation 
occurs when the court finds evidence to support the findings 
or inferences drawn but determines that on the record as a whole 
that evidence is not substantial.76 The Fourth Circuit vacated 
71 Folds v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 658 at 661. The case involved a claim that 
respondent's medication would remove pimples. 
72 Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 246 F. (2d) 458. See also Burton-
Dixie Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 166, and Minneapolis-Honeywell v. FTC, 
(7th Cir. 1957) 191 F. (2d) 786, cert. dismissed 344 U.S. 206 (1952). It is worth noting that 
all four of these cases arose in the Seventh Circuit. 
78 Allied Paper Mills v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 600, cert. den. 336 U.S. 918 
(1949). 
74 Callaghan & Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1948) 163 F. (2d) 359, and Metropolitan Bag & 
Paper Dist. Assn. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 341, cert. den. 355 U.S. 819 (1957). 
75See, e.g., Prima Products v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 405; Stokely-Van 
Camp v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 246 F. (2d) 458; and Stenographic Machines, Inc. v. FTC, 
(7th Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 755. 
76See, e.g., Minneapolis-Honeywell Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d} 786 at 
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an order when all the evidence supporting it had been taken 
more than six years prior to its issuance, the court saying that 
it was not substantial.77 
An interesting problem recently arose in the Ninth Circuit. 
Respondent advertised that its device for shoes was "scientific" 
and "improved posture." The commission issued a cease and 
desist order after concluding that this was false advertising. The 
Ninth Circuit went along with the commission on the "scientific'' 
claim, saying that on a highly technical matter where experts 
testified either way the commission could take its choice. But 
on the "improved posture" claim the court felt that other evi-
dence in the record so detracted from the commission's finding 
that it was unsupported by substantial evidence.78 On certiorari, 
the Supreme Court in just two sentences reinstated the entire 
order of the commission.79 It could be argued that the Supreme 
Court felt that the Ninth Circuit had re-evaluated the evidence 
itself instead of simply applying the test of Universal Camera. 
V. Judicial Review on Scope of Order 
A. Background. In appraising the extent of judicial review 
of a Federal Trade Commission order it is important to note the 
breadth of the statute. It provides that the reviewing court 
shall have the power to make a decree "affirming, modifying, or 
setting aside the order of the Commission .... "80 This language 
makes it clear that the framers of the statute intended that the 
courts of appeals have ultimate control over the remedy as well 
as,other aspects of the case. This power was exercised by the Su-
preme Court in 1933 when it modified the scope of an order say-
ing, "the orders should go no further than is reasonably necessary 
to correct the evil and preserve the rights of competitors and 
public .... "81 The classic exposition of the extent of the judicial 
review, however, appears in Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade 
792, cert. dismissed 344 U.S. 206 (1952), and Metropolitan Bag &: Paper Dist. Assn. v. 
FTC, (2d Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 341, cert. den. 355 U.S. 819 (1957). 
77 New Standard Publishing Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 181. 
78 Sewell v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1956) 240 F. (2d) 228, revd. 353 U.S. 969 (1957). 
79 FTC v. Sewell, 353 U.S. 969 (1957). 
80 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45c. The same provision appears in the 
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 735 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21. 
81FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 at 217 (1933). 
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Gommission82 where Justice Douglas explained that the com-
mission has a "wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed 
adequate to cope with the unlawful practices"88 and that the 
courts will not interfere unless the commission has "abused its 
discretion"84 in the selection of a remedy. 
The purpose of an order of the commission is not to penalize. 
Rather its function is remedial, or "to stop the unfair practice" 
as was indicated by the Seventh Circuit.85 With this in mind, 
the pertinent cases will now be analyzed in order to determine 
when the courts have felt that there has been an abuse of discretion. 
B. Some Typical Orders. The reporters are full of cases 
where the court failed to find an abuse of discretion. The Second 
Circuit held that it was proper for the commission to order a 
publisher to indicate clearly on the cover and in advertising 
the fact that a reprinted story was abridged. It also approved an 
order requiring the publisher to indicate the original title to 
the story when that title had been changed in the republication.86 
And more recently it stopped a respondent from soliciting ad-
vertising by mail because the presentation would be deceiving 
if the recipient did not take time to read the material thor-
oughly.87 In a recent case the Supreme Court upheld a com-
mission order which prohibited all respondents in a conspiracy 
case from individually adopting a similar pricing system for 
the purpose or effect of "matching prices of competitors."88 
On the other hand, an abuse of discretion was found when the 
commission's order refused to allow respondent to indicate to 
the public his old firm name in conjunction with a new name 
he was required to select at the order of the commission;89 and 
another case modified a commission order involving false ad-
vertising, indicating that it was not within the power of the 
commission to require respondent to state that his product 
82 327 U.S. 608 (1946). 
83 Id. at 611. 
84 Id. at 612. 
85 Eugene Dietzen Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 321 at 331, cert. den. 323 
U.S. 730 (1944). 
86 Hillman Periodicals, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 122. For subsequent 
confusion, see New American Library v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 143, alfd. after 
remand to commission 227 F. (2d) 384 (1955). 
87 Independent Directory Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 468. 
88 FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957). 
89 Gold Tone Studios v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 257. 
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was valueless more often than not.90 But it is noteworthy that 
these two cases are the only ones found cutting down the scope 
of the order by this direct method. 
In contrast, in Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt 
Co.91 the Supreme Court felt that the commission shifted too 
much- responsibility to the courts. This was a price discrimination 
case, and the commission's order allowed respondent to make 
price differentials of up to five cents per case where they would 
not "tend to lessen, injure or destroy competition." The Supreme 
Court objected to this part of the order, saying that it amounted 
to shifting to the courts issues "which Congress has primarily 
entrusted to the Commission."92 
C. Some Peripheral Problems. As opposed to cases which 
relate directly to the practices involved, there are others which 
raise important peripheral problems with regard to the pro-
priety of an order, including delaying its effective date and 
determining the persons and practices properly reached. 
Two recent cases before the Supreme Court have made it 
clear that it is up to the commission to decide whether its order 
shall be held in abeyance.93 In those cases, respondents argued 
that making the order immediately effective against them, the 
first two parties in the industry to be proceeded against, while 
competitive firms were engaging in the same practices, would 
force them out of business. The Court said that the decision of 
holding up the effective date of the order was squarely up to 
the commission and that it would not be overturned short of a 
"patent abuse of discretion."94 
What parties can be reached by an order of the commission 
has often been an issue on appeal. The situation arises when a 
corporate respondent is wholly owned by a small group of 
individuals, all active in the management of the corporation, 
and joined with it as respondents. The Supreme Court held over 
twenty years ago that it was proper to direct an order against 
the individuals when the findings indicated that "further efforts 
of these individual respondents to evade orders of the Com-
90 Alberty v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 36, cert. den. 340 U.S. 818 (1950). 
91334 U.S. 37 (1948). 
92Id. at 54. 
98 Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958), involving two cases consolidated 
for hearing. 
94 Id. at 414. 
1959] COMMENTS 1207 
mission might be anticipated .... "95 Since it is clear that the 
order to a corporation covers its active management, 96 the very 
fact that the individuals appeal indicates that they may attempt 
to evade the commission's order, and this, as will be seen pres-
ently, should be sufficient basis to warrant extending it to include 
them. 
The cases in the courts of appeals reflect the same result. 
The only difficulty seems to be in defining what activity of an 
individual is sufficient to warrant an order against him per-
sonally. The Seventh Circuit upheld an order after noting that 
the individual was "no ordinary employee and did direct and 
have sufficient control of the policies and sales activities" of the 
company.97 Judge Learned Hand said that the order may include 
"those officers of a corporation who are in top control of the 
activities that the Commission finds to have violated the Act."98 
A more drastic order was aimed at an individual who had 
resigned as a corporate officer and director and disposed of his 
stock in the corporation. The Second Circuit's reason for sus-
taining this order was that there were other unlawful ways for 
him to conduct himself in the future.99 
Another important problem is what practices can be reached 
by an order of the Federal Trade Commission. Turning first 
to discontinued practices, it seems evident that abandonment 
of the practice alone is no basis for dismissing the complaint.100 
In addition, there must be "no reasonable likelihood" that the 
discontinued practice will _be resumed,101 and a reading of the 
cases indicates that this test is rarely met. Two years' discon-
95 FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 at 119 (1937), motion to amend 
opinion den. 302 U.S. 661 (1938). 
96 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 at 376 (1911). 
97 Surf Sales Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1958) 259 F. (2d) 744 at 747. The Seventh Circuit 
now adheres to the principle laid down in FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 
112 (1937), motion to amend opinion den. 302 U.S. 661 (1938), but it has not always 
done so. See R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 535, for a 
contrary result. This was abandoned in Clayton Act proceedings in Anchor Serum Co. v. 
FTC, (7th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 867, and finally under the Federal Trade Commission Act 
in ,Mandel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1958) 254 F. (2d) 18, revd. on other grounds 359 
U.S. 385 (1959). 
98 Standard Distributors v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 7 at 15. 
99 Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 404 at 408, cert. den. 
344 U.S. 912 (1953). 
100 FTC v. Goodrich Tire &: Rubber Co., 304 U.S. 257 (1938). 
101 Automobile -Owners Safety Insurance Co. v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 295 
at 297, cert. den. 358 U.S. 875 (1958). 
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tinuance alone is not enough,1°2 and neither is four.103 Nor is a 
longer period sufficient if other violations are continued.104 A 
promise not to continue to act in the future is no justification 
for dismissal of the complaint.105 On the other hand, a discon-
tinuance in excess of six years prior to issuance of the com-
plaint was deemed sufficient by the Ninth Circuit to warrant 
setting aside an order, although the court suggested that passage 
of time alone was not of determinative importance.106 
The order of the commission may be directed at practices 
related to those found to have been committed by respondent. 
In 1951 the Supreme Court indicated that "the Commission is 
not limited to prohibiting the illegal practice in the precise 
form in which it is found to have existed in the past."107 Thus, 
where respondent was found to have discriminated in price in 
some of its products, an order directed at all products of like 
grade and quality was sustained.108 Similarly, where an ice 
cream producer was found to discriminate in price on one type 
of ice cream cone in one limited area, the court sustained an 
order directed at all ice cream cones sold by the producer every-
where. Justifying the result, the court said it was to "prevent 
evasion" and halt practices "of the same general kind" that re-
spondent had engaged in.100 And in a false advertising case it was 
held proper for the order to proscribe advertising found false as 
to products which respondent then had on the market and also 
"substantially similar" products which might be marketed in 
the future. 110 The court felt this was necessary in order to prevent 
evasion by the simple expedient of changing the brand name. 
102 C. H. Hunt Pen Co. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 273. 
103 Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 673. 
104 Dejay Stores, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 865. 
105 Goodman v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 584. 
106 Oregon-Washington Plywood Co. v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 48. Cases 
of this -type might also be explained by a failure to find substantial evidence, or :by a lack 
of public interest. 
107 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 at 4'13 (1952). This language was cited by 
the Court during the present term when it reinstated an order of the commission acting 
under the Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 1'15 (1951), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §69, which 
enjoined certain practices of respondent related to other activity by it which the com-
mission had found to be in violation of the statute. FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 
U.S. 385 (1959). 
108 E. Edelmann &: Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 152, cert. den. 355 U.S. 941 
(1958). 
100 Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) '116 at '118. 
110P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 52. 
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It is important to note that orders of the FTC may properly 
be directed at violations still in their incipiency.111 Indeed, this 
was an important purpose of the statute, for the feeling of many 
at the time of its passage was that the damage had been done by 
the time a full-blown Sherman Act violation had occurred.112 
Thus the commission is authorized to issue an order under 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act113 though the 
practices attacked have not fully matured. 
There is also a group of cases in which the courts merely 
clarify what the commission has done by its order. Thus, when 
a commission order banned establishment of a single sales agent 
for a group of producers, the court clarified the order so as only 
to ban price-fixing arrangements through the medium of the 
agent.114 When an order of the commission is capable of different 
interpretations, the court may modify it so that the meaning 
is clear.115 However, one court refused to modify an order that 
included the phrase "in substantial part." The court felt that 
no interpretation was necessary, for if respondent would act 
within the spirit of the law he would not come close to treading 
in the proscribed area.116 It seems fair to conclude that when 
respondent's good faith activity might run afoul of an ambiguous 
order, the courts are willing to clarify and make the order more 
explicit. 
VI. Power of Court of Appeals To Order Taking of 
Additional Evidence 
The Federal Trade Commission Act gives the court of 
appeals discretion to order the adducing of additional evidence 
before the commission, if it is material and if there are reasonable 
grounds to excuse the failure to present it at the original hear-
ing.117 Acting pursuant to this provision, the Supreme Court 
111 Fashion -Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 at 466 (1941), mod. 
312 U.S. 668 (1941). 
112 See Justice Brandeis' dissent in FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 at 435 (1920). 
113 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45a. 
114 Virginia Excelsior Mills v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1958) 256 F. (2d) 538. 
115 See, e.g., Hamilton iMfg. Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 346, and Bork 
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 611, for two different modifications of the 
same order. See also Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 382, mod. 
348 U.S. 940 (1955). 
116Edward P. Paul & Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 294. 
117 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45c. A similar provision appears in the Clay-
ton Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21. 
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recently directed the Ninth Circuit to amend its judgment setting 
aside an order of the commission and to direct the commission 
to take additional evidence.118 The court of appeals had sus-
tained respondent's claim that it was denied a fair hearing because 
of lack of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The significance 
of the Supreme Court decision is that the commission was author-
ized to reopen the entire case. 
The Seventh Circuit has dealt less leniently with similar re~ 
quests by respondents. In a case involving price discrimination 
respondent had urged that it was a part of the commission's case 
to prove absence of cost justification. The court held the burden 
was on respondent, and then refused its motion to put in the 
additional evidence since it found no "reasonable ground" for 
failure to do so originally.119 The decision of the court in refusing 
to allow the adducing of additional evidence seems easier to justify 
when respondent could claim only that it felt it would win on 
other grounds and thought an offer of proof would be useless and 
expensive.120 
The attitude of the District of Columbia Circuit has been 
more liberal. When subsequent to the hearing before the com-
mission a clinical test and survey results became available for 
the first time, the court allowed the motion to present these as 
evidence before the commission at a later hearing. It did, however, 
say that the commission's order, directed at advertising misrepre-
sentations, would be effective pending the rehearing.121 
VIL The Impact of the Administrative Procedure Act 
Apart from the Universal Camera situation there is apparently 
but one instance in which a Federal Trade Commission case was 
llSFTC v. Carter Products, Inc., 346 U.S. 327 (1953). 
119 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 433, revd. 346 U.S. 
61 (1952). The case was reversed on the_ burden of proof question when respondent was 
granted review by the Supreme Court, 346 U.S. 61 (1952). This indicates the Seventh 
Circuit will not find "reasonable ground" when there is an honest difference in the 
interpretation of the statute and in the evidence required. In contrast see Simplicity 
Pattern Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 673 at 683, revd. on other grounds 27 
U.S. LAW WEEK 4389 (1959), where the court of appeals did indicate that respondent 
could put in additional evidence after the statutory ambiguity as to burden of proof 
had been resolved. 
120 Independent Grocers Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 941. 
121 Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 742, cert. den. 348 U.S. 981 
(1955), found in contempt for violation of order, 247 F. (2d) 524 (1956). 
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reversed because of the Administrative Procedure Act. In that 
case the Eighth Circuit held that the requirements of section 
5c of the act122 had not been met when the commission changed 
hearing examiners in the middle of a case.123 The court felt the 
original examiner had not become "unavailable" to the com-
mission simply because he had reached retirement age. It.hinted 
at some bungling in commission handling of the matter, and also 
took care to note that the "retired" examiner was now working 
for another government agency. In addition, the court indicated 
the extreme importance of having the credibility evaluation made 
by the examiner who heard the case. 
Other respondents have not fared so well in relying on the 
statute. One court felt the mandate of section 7 c124 was violated 
when certain scientific evidence was excluded by the examiner, 
but it felt that refusal to admit evidence incompetent in a court 
was not such a denial of "substantial justice" as would warrant 
a reversal.125 And the requirement of section ll126 of the statute 
was held not violated when an examiner was assigned out of 
rotation for purposes of economy.127 
The absence of cases may be used as a basis for saying the 
Administrative Procedure Act has had but limited effect. It seems 
only fair to note two contrasting factors, however. First, this 
study did not purport to reach all aspects of the statute, sub-
poenas among other things being omitted. Secondly, in some areas 
the absence of cases may indicate explicit compliance with the 
directive of the statute, as in the case of separation of functions128 
and burden of proof problems.129 
122 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1004c, provides that the same officers who 
preside at the reception of evidence "shall make the . • • initial decision • • • except 
where such officers become unavailable to the agency." 
123 Gamble-Skogmo v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1954) 2ll F. (2d) 106. 
124 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1006c, says that "any oral or documentary 
evidence may be received," that agency policy shall provide for the exclusion of "irrel-
evant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence," and that no order shall be issued 
"except .•. in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." 
125 Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 742 at 749, cert. den. 348 U.S. 
981 (1955), found in contempt for violation of order 247 F. (2d) 524 (1956). See notes 52, 
53 and accompanying text. 
126 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1010 indicates that examiners "shall be as-
signed to cases in rotation so far as practicable. • . ." 
127 Tractor Training Service v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 420, cert. den. 350 
U.S. 1005 (1956). 
128 See Federal Trade Commission, Rules of Practice, May 1957, rule 3.15e. 
129 Id., rule 3.14a. 
1212- MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 57 
VIII. Conclusion 
In concluding, some reference should be made to the statistics 
presented at the outset. It would seem that, for several reasons, 
over-emphasis should not be placed on the high percentage of 
cases sustaining the commission. First, all the cases going before the 
courts of appeals are ones which respondent lost initially, for the 
commission does not, of course, seek review of cases in which it 
has dismissed the complaint. Thus, only a portion of the commis-
sion's activity is seen by a review of appellate cases. Second, it is 
probably true that in all areas the reviewing courts tend to affirm 
the action below more often than not. Finally, with the commis-
sion limited as to both funds and manpower, it is natural for it to 
proceed against the obvious violators first and either postpone 
action against other possible violators until a later date when the 
violation becomes more obvious or disregard it altogether. 
Nevertheless, because it is an infrequent case in which re-
spondent gets complete relief at the appellate level, the procedure 
before the commission is of great importance in dictating the 
final result. Adoption of several recommendations of the Hoover 
Commission Task Force on Legal Services and Procedures would 
assure a respondent of continued fair treatment before the com-
mission and would also expedite and clarify the process of judicial 
review. These recommendations include extension of the internal 
separation of functions to include the process of final decision 
by agency heads,130 alteration of the rules of evidence so as to 
follow the same rules that are applied in the United States district 
courts in non-jury cases,131 and limiting the power of review 
of an initial decision by the agency to the powers that a reviewing 
court would have and to matters of agency policy.132 
-Recommendation 52 of the Task Force also deserves atten-
tion.133 It calls for a clarification of the scope of judicial review 
on matters of agency discretion, fact issues, and mixed questions 
of law and fact. In all three instances the Task Force calls for a 
broader review by the courts. One result of acceptance of this 
recommendation would be abandonment of the substantial evi-
dence test of Universal Camera in favor of another standard, 
180 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, Task 
Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure, recommendation 41, p. 176 (1955). 
131 Id., recommendation 47, p. 199. 
132 Id,, recommendation 49, p. 203. 
133Id., at p. 214. 
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that of setting aside the findings of fact if clearly erroneous in 
view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the 
whole record. This is the standard applied when non-jury district 
court proceedings are reviewed. This suggestion makes sense, 
particularly when cognizance is taken of the fact that both the 
commission and the district court are essentially similar triers 
of fact. It would avoid the application of a double standard by 
the court of appeals, one test for agency proceedings, another 
for cases from the district court. It is perhaps quite reasonable 
to take the position that the agency's fact-finding function in an 
adjudicative hearing is no different from that of a district court. 
This would seem to require an upgrading of the status of the 
hearing examiner's initial decision and limiting the reviewing 
power of the commission to that of an appellate court, for the 
examiner would be regarded as in a position equivalent to that 
of a district judge. Another result of adoption of these recom-
mendations would be a clear authorization to the reviewing court 
to make a de novo application of the law to the facts as found 
in the course of its review of commission proceedings, a situation 
the Task Force feels is at present somewhat unsettled. 
A final, controversial recommendation of the Task Force to 
be noted here is that calling for the creation of a Trade Section 
of an Administrative Court to take over the adjudicative func-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission.134 This would bring 
about, in the view of the Task Force, "the more effective per-
formance by the Federal Trade Commission of its essentially 
administrative and regulatory functions." It further notes that 
in trade regulation, "industry cooperation is more important than 
industry prosecution." This recommendation would be important, 
in view of the great significance of the agency fact-finding process, 
if it could be shown that the present system was unsatisfactory. 
However, the more recent cases reviewed in the course of this 
comment do not give evidence of any judicial misgivings about 
the present commission practices. As a matter of fact, the con-
trary seems to be the case, for otherwise it would seem likely 
that the commission's findings would be upset with more fre-
quency. Whether a trade court might be justified on grounds that 
it would facilitate administration through centralization, effect 
economy, or cause all trade cases to be heard before a single com- · 
184 Id., recommendation 64-, p. 250. 
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petent tribunal is another matter.185 But it does not appear that 
the cases as a whole suggest that faulty performance by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission should be used as the reason for with-
drawing its adjudicative functions. 
David A. Nelson, S. Ed. 
135 One point stressed by the Task Force Report is -that several other agencies cur-
rently handle a minimum number of trade cases annually, and the Task Force questions 
their competence properly to handle those cases. The establishment of a trade court 
would centralize handling of all these cases in a single expert tribunal. For two critical 
views on the trade court, see Kintner, "The Trade Court Proposal: An Examination of 
Some Possible Defects," 44 A.B.A.J. 441 (1958), and Freer, "The Case Against the Trade 
Regulation Section of the Proposed Administrative Court," 24 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 637 
(1956). 
